The cost of abating CO2 emissions by renewable energy incentives in Germany by MARCANTONINI, Claudio & ELLERMAN, A. Denny
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2013/05 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Climate Policy Research Unit 
The Cost of Abating CO2 Emissions by Renewable 
Energy Incentives in Germany 
 
Claudio Marcantonini and A. Denny Ellerman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Climate Policy Research Unit 
 
 
 
 
The Cost of Abating CO2 Emissions by Renewable Energy 
Incentives in Germany 
 
  
 Claudio Marcantonini and A. Denny Ellerman 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/05 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Claudio Marcantonini and A. Denny Ellerman, 2013 
Printed in Italy, February 2013 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano 
Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Climate Policy Research Unit 
The Climate Policy Research Unit (CPRU) is a research group within the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies under the Loyola de Palacio Chair. The goal of the CPRU is to provide a reliable 
source for information and analysis of EU climate policy and a forum for discussion of research 
carried out in this area among government officials, academics and industry. 
The CPRU was established in 2010 at the initiative of Josep Borrell, President of the EUI and former 
President of the European Parliament, as a means of providing more focus to European climate policy 
developments. The director of the CPRU is Denny Ellerman, part-time professor at the RSCAS, and 
recently retired as a Senior Lecturer from MIT's Sloan School of Management. The CPRU works in 
collaboration with the energy and regulatory policy research groups of the Florence School of 
Regulation and Loyola de Palacio Chair and with the Global Governance Programme at the EUI. 
Starting in 2012, the CPRU has been funded primarily by the European Commission (DG Climate 
Action).  
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not represent the views of the 
European University Institute or any of its subsidiary components or those of the European 
Commission. 
For more information:  
http://fsr.eui.eu/CPRU/Index.aspx 
  
Abstract 
Incentives for the development of renewable energy have increasingly become an instrument of 
climate policy, that is, as a means to reduce GHG emissions. This research analyzes the German 
experience in promoting renewable energy over the past decade to identify the ex post cost of reducing 
CO2 emissions through the promotion of renewable energy, specifically, wind and solar. To this 
propose, we calculated the annual CO2 abatement cost for the years 2006- 2010 as the ratio of the net 
cost over the CO2 emission reductions resulting from the use of renewable energy. The net cost is the 
sum of the costs and cost savings due to the injection of renewable energy into the electric power 
system. Results show that CO2 abatement cost of wind are relatively low, of the order of tens of Euro 
per tonne of CO2, while CO2 abatement cost of solar are very high, of the order of hundreds of Euro 
per tonne of CO2. CO2 abatement cost has changed considerably over the years due to variations of 
fossil fuels prices, carbon price and the amount of generated renewable energy. 
Keywords 
Renewables incentives, wind energy, solar energy, abatement cost, EU ETS. 
1 Introduction
In adopting the Climate and Energy Package in 2009, the European Union (EU) made the
promotion of Renewable Energy (RE) a distinct element of climate policy. As stated in the first
of the ninety-seven whereas’s in the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC),
"the increased use of energy from renewable sources [...] constitutes an important
part of the package of measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
comply with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convenion on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and other further Community and international green-
house gas emission reduction commitments beyond 2012."
Like the Emissions Trading System (ETS), a companion measure in the Climate and Energy
Package, the Renewable Energy Directive implies an additional incentive to increase the RE
share and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions below what they would otherwise be. Un-
like the ETS, the additional incentive is not uniform throughout the EU. Instead, each member
state is expected to develop a national "support scheme" to ensure achievement of that mem-
ber states’ share of the EU-wide target of a 20% share of gross energy consumption from RE
sources by 2020. Those support schemes can take various forms, but all provide some extra
incentive that can be seen as comparable to the carbon price created by the ETS. It is only nat-
ural then to ask: what is the implicit carbon price embodied in these RE support schemes? And
how do these country-specific implicit carbon prices compare with the price of European Union
Allowances (EUAs)?
This paper proposes to answer that question for Germany, the member state that has
played as large a role as any in the expansion of RE in the EU. The German Renewable En-
ergy Act (EEG), which came into force in 2000, defined a system of feed-in tariff (FIT) for all
renewable technologies that triggered an impressive growth of wind and solar capacity. Wind
capacity grew more than four-fold from 6 GW in 2000 to 27 GW in 2010, solar capacity more
than twenty-fold from 76 MW in 2000 to 17 GW in 2010 (BMU, 2012). These two forms of
RE are the focus of our study.
To facilitate comparison with the explicit carbon price produced by the ETS, we seek to
determine the net cost per ton of CO2 (tCO2) emissions abated as a result of the German RE
support scheme taking into account all the relevant costs and cost savings associated with the
use of RE. As would be the case with the EUA price, other benefits -whether they are expressed
as energy security, innovation, jobs, non-CO2 emissions, etc.- are not included, nor are costs
associated with transmission and distribution. The denominator of the cost statistic derived in
this paper uses the estimates of the quantity of CO2 abated as a result of injections of wind and
solar energy for the years 2006-2010, as estimated by Weigt et al. (2012) using a deterministic
unit commitment model of the German electricity system.1 Most of the paper is devoted to the
numerator: the costs and cost savings associated with the particular form of support provided
to RE generation in Germany.
A number of studies have analyzed the costs and benefits of renewable generation on dif-
ferent electric power systems, such as Ireland (Denny and O’Malley, 2007), UK (Dale et al.,
1With CO2 abatement we always mean a reduction of CO2 emissions in the power generation system, not
with respect to the total aggregated CO2 emissions. As CO2 emissions are capped by the EU ETS, the total CO2
emissions are not reduced and the net effect of the injection of RE energy is to displace CO2 emissions from the
electricity sector to other ETS sectors.
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2004), Nordic countries (Holttinen, 2004), some of them with a specific focus on the intermit-
tency cost of wind (Gross et al., 2006; IEA, 2011). The results from these works are difficult to
compare because of the different methodologies, data and scenarios analyzed (Holttinen et al.,
2011). In 2005, DENA published an important and comprehensive study on wind deployment
in Germany (DEWI et al., 2005). Among other things, it calculated the cost of CO2 abatement
due to wind energy taking into account the cost of FIT. It compares the net cost and CO2 emis-
sions of the system in 2007, 2010 and 2015 between two scenarios: the first one with the future
wind capacity remaining the same as in 2003, and second one with a large wind capacity that
is developed through the FIT. Results depend on the assumptions made for the fuel and carbon
prices. With a carbon price in the range of e5-10 per tCO2, the estimated annual CO2 abate-
ment cost of wind in the years 2007, 2010 goes from a minimum of e56.6/tCO2 to a maximum
of e168.0/tCO2. All of these studies take an ex-ante approach. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper to estimate the CO2 abatement cost of RE incentives from an ex-post point of view.
With regard to ex-post analyses, several works have analyzed the impact of RE on the
electricity price, e.g. Sensfuß et al. (2008) for Germany, Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008), Gelabert
et al. (2011) for Spain, Jónsson et al. (2010) for Denmark. The analyses show that the injection
of RE reduces the wholesale price of electricity price, often called the merit order effect, and
that the savings can be large enough to exceed the total annual expenditure for FIT, as was the
case for Germany in 2006 (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Others (Gelabert et al., 2011) have found that,
although present initially, the merit order effect disappears over time.
There is also a substantial amount of literature available - both theoretical and empirical -
on renewable incentives. The focus of the empirical studies is mostly on the comparison of the
different supporting schemes and in their effectiveness to promote the deployment of renewable
technologies (Lipp, 2007; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Steinhilber et al., 2011), but not on
their cost to reduce CO2 emissions.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 provides a categorization and general discus-
sion of the costs and cost savings associated with the use of wind and solar energy. Section 3
describes in detail the methodology used to estimate these costs and cost savings. Section 4
presents the results and a sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Costs and cost savings of renewable generation
This Section briefly describes the six cost and cost saving components taken into account in
calculating the cost of abating CO2 emissions by promoting wind and solar energy in the elec-
tricity sector. We also discuss why the merit-order effect is not one of these components. The
included components are associated with the cost of generation behind the busbar, that is, ex-
cluding the cost that may be incurred in connecting these generating sources to the grid, as well
as any costs or cost savings associated with congestion in the operation of the transmission and
distribution system. Finally, as stated before, other possible benefits from the use of RE related
to energy security, non-CO2 related emissions, or jobs are also excluded. The cost components
that are included are the remuneration to generators, additional balancing cost and additional
cycling costs; the cost savings components are the cost savings form the avoided fossil fuel use
and carbon costs, and the cost savings from added generating capacity.
An important aspect of wind and solar energy is intermittency, which includes two in-
dependent aspects: non-controllable variability and partial unpredictability (Pérez-Arriaga and
Batlle, 2012). Every power plant, including fossil fuel generation, is variable and unpredictable
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to a certain degree, but wind and solar power plants present these characteristics at a much
higher level. The unpredictability of wind and solar energy could be expected to increase the
cost of balancing the electric power system, while its variability has an impact on cycling cost.
2.1 Remuneration to generators
In general, producers of renewable generation are remunerated at a rate that is on average higher
than the price at which the electricity they produce could be sold in the wholesale market. This
higher remuneration can take various forms, but in Germany, it takes the form of guaranteed
FITs or fixed prices whose costs are charged to consumers. Many studies that analyze the cost
of renewable generation focus on the generation cost, which in the case of RE consists almost
entirely of the initial capital cost and the return on and of the initial investment. While many
have commented on the extent to which this cost has been declining, cost data on actual capital
outlays are not available for either renewable or competing fossil generation. A more accessible
metric is the price paid for the output, which can be expected to cover all relevant costs in
well-functioning markets, as well as extra profit and unanticipated losses in some instances.
The payments to producers are real expenditures and they are the starting point for devising
any relevant metric of cost. In the case of the German FIT, payments are front-loaded and we
explain in the subsequent methodology Section how we avoid over-stating this cost in the early
years of RE program.
2.2 Additional cycling costs
Cycling refers to the operations of conventional plants required to respond to load variations
and cycling cost is the cost related to them (Lefton et al., 1997). The increase of energy from
intermittent generation reduces the demand for conventional thermal generation and may cause
the output of those plants to vary more than would otherwise be the case. In general, cycling
costs are increased (Pérez-Arriaga and Batlle, 2012). Firstly, fossil fuel plants could have more
start-ups and shut-downs of production, implying an increase of start-up and ramping costs.
Secondly, because of the decrease in the demand for thermal generation, conventional power
plants tend to work at a lower capacity factor than the one designed for maximum efficiency.
Thirdly, the increase of the cycling activity accelerates component failure and increases main-
tenance costs. The increase of cycling costs is higher especially when more cycling is required
to fossil units that were designed for base-load operation (Troy et al., 2010).
2.3 Additional balancing cost
The electric system needs supply and demand to be exactly balanced at all times. The balancing
operation refers to the actions undertaken by the TSO to ensure that demand is equal to supply
in and near real time. Due to sudden disturbances, such as unanticipated fluctuations of load or
electric short circuits, the system operators must make relatively small adjustments with respect
to the scheduled dispatching. The balancing is made by purchasing services from generators or
adjustable loads whose costs are paid by consumers in the electricity retail price. The system
balancing reserve is the provision of capacity the system operator can deploy for balancing the
system in real time. The unexpected fluctuations of intermittent generation increase the varia-
tion of supply in the short-term. This implies more balancing operations as well as additional
system balancing reserves (Milligan et al., 2010). The amount of the additional balancing cost
due to intermittent generation depends on many factors such as the level of wind and solar pen-
etrations, the quality of weather forecast, the flexibility of the existing generation portfolio, the
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balancing market rule.2 With regard to wind, a number of studies have been carried out on the
balancing cost. Results indicate that the additional reserve requirement, as a proportion of the
wind capacity installed, tends to be relatively small and that the additional balancing cost is
about a few Euro per MWh of wind energy, also for high wind penetration (Gross et al., 2006;
Holttinen et al., 2011; IEA, 2011). This is because short run fluctuations of wind energy are
comparable with other variations of supply and demand (Gross et al., 2006).
2.4 Fuel cost saving
From the perspective adopted in this paper, the fixed price paid in Germany for RE generation
buys a joint product: electricity and CO2 abatement. Priority access to the grid, not to mention
near-zero variable costs of generation, means that when available renewable generation nearly
always displaces conventional fossil fuel generation, typically either coal or natural gas. The
cost of the fossil fuel required to generate the electricity thus displaced is a cost saving since
it is what would be paid out to produce the same amount of electricity. Consequently, it must
be subtracted from the payment to generators to isolate the additional cost for abating CO2
emissions. This cost saving depends on the quantity and prices of the coal or natural gas not
purchased, but figuring out what is displaced when wind or solar generation is injected into
the grid is not easy. In this paper, the quantity and type of fossil fuel combustion avoided is
taken from the simulations of the German electricity system for the years 2006-10 performed
by Weigt et al. (2012) using actual hourly data for load and solar and wind injections, average
monthly fuel prices determining dispatch order, and typical technology-dependent, efficiency
factors for various levels of load at generating plants. The quantities of each fuel displaced are
those indicated by the difference between the scenario calibrated to replicate observed load and
injections with the counterfactual scenarios in which the only change is that the RE injections
are taken away. The quantities thus indicated are multiplied by the monthly fuel prices to
determine the fuel cost savings, or more broadly, what would have been the cost of generating
an amount of electricity equal to the RE injection. Since natural gas prices are always higher
than coal prices, cost savings are greater per MWh of displaced natural gas generation than
for coal generation. Finally, natural gas and coal prices are exogenous and assumed not to be
affected significantly by the reduction in demand occasioned by RE injections in the German
electricity system.
2.5 Carbon cost saving
Carbon cost savings are determined in the same manner as the fuel cost savings, that is, as the
difference in quantities between the calibrated observed simulation and the appropriate counter-
factual, using typical emission factors for the fossil fuel combustion avoided and actual average
monthly allowance prices. In contrast to fuel cost savings, carbon cost savings are greater
for displaced coal generation than for natural gas generation since the emissions avoided by
displaced coal generation are higher than for natural gas. Carbon prices are also treated as ex-
ogenous, but the assumption that these prices are not significantly affected by RE injections in
Germany is subject to serious challenge. We treat the carbon price as exogenous because of the
absence of reliable estimates of the effect of RE injections on the carbon price. Given the likely
non-trivial effect of RE injections on EUA prices, the appropriate price for calculating carbon
cost savings would be the higher carbon price that would obtain when the RE injections are not
2Some studies under balancing cost also include the loss of efficiency in the use of existing conventional
generation in the medium term due to the additional cycling cost (Holttinen et al., 2011).
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present. We discuss the possible effect of this higher price in the Section presenting results and
sensitivity analysis.
2.6 Capacity saving
Developing renewable generation increases generation capacity in the system, although not
by the same amount as equivalent fossil-fuel generating capacity since intermittent generation
does not provide the same degree of reliability. Nevertheless, the equivalent amount of avoided
dispatchable capacity is not zero since on average the amount of fossil generation required is
less. Hence some conventional capacity could be retired or, alternatively, less conventional
capacity would need to be built in the future. The capacity credit is the amount of conventional
capacity that can be displaced by intermittent plants while preserving the same level of system
security and is generally expressed as a percentage of the installed capacity of intermittent
generators (Gross et al., 2006). The capacity saving is the saving in the fixed cost of building
or maintaining the conventional capacity no longer needed as a result of the capacity credit.
There is a large literature on wind energy addressing this issue (see Gross et al. (2006), Giebel
(2005), IEA (2011) for a comparison of studies). Results show that the capacity credit depends
on many factors such as the quantity and distribution of wind, the level of energy storage,
the network system; its value differs from country to country. If calculated as percentage of
installed capacity, it tends to decrease with penetration of wind energy. All studies agree that
the capacity credit is never zero, but that it can be small.
An important concept related to capacity credit, and often used to calculate the cost of
wind generation, is back-up capacity. This is the conventional capacity reserve that would
make wind generation as reliable as an equivalent amount of conventional dispatchable capacity.
Back-up capacity is complementary to the capacity credit: the lower the capacity credit, the
higher is the required back up capacity. (Gross (2006) shows the analytic relation between the
back-up cost and the capacity saving.) The relationship between the capacity credit and back-
up capacity cost can be illustrated by a simple example. Imagine a system that is anticipating
additional load that would require 100 MW of conventional dispatchable capacity. If one starts
with building 100 MW of wind capacity, then the cost of the required back-up capacity must
be added. In nearly all instances, the required back-up capacity will be less than 100 MW.
Alternatively, one can start with 100 MW of dispatchable capacity, then add wind capacity, and
determine how much less dispatchable capacity would be needed because of the added wind
capacity. The analysis presented in this paper takes the latter approach as more appropriate
when wind is added to an existing system with adequate conventional capacity to meet demand,
as is the case in Germany. The cost savings results either from some existing capacity that
no longer needs to be maintained or from new capacity that will not have to be built to meet
anticipated demand.
2.7 Merit order effect
The merit order effect is the reduction of wholesale electricity price as result of the RE injec-
tions, which is sometimes argued as a cost savings that should be counted against the subsidy
paid for RE (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Fig. 1 presents a stylized representation of the effect of in-
jecting RE energy into the electricity system and it is used to explain why the savings resulting
from the merit order effect is not included.
The line MC represents an approximation of the dispatch order of conventional generation
plants on a typical electrical system in which those with the lowest variable or marginal cost are
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Figure 1: merit order effect. MC: marginal cost of conventional generators; Q(QRES):
demand of electricity from conventional generators without(with) renewable energy in the
system; P(PRES): price of electricity without(with) renewable energy in the system.
dispatched ahead of high variable cost plants. Absent injections of wind or solar generation, the
generation demanded of this set of plants, would be Q, the wholesale price for electricity, P, and
the amount paid to generators in the wholesale market, abcd. Of this amount, acd represents
variable costs incurred in the generation of Q electricity while abc is the producer’s surplus or
infra-marginal rents from which capital and other fixed costs are recovered.
When wind or solar generation is injected into this system, the demand upon these gener-
ators is reduced to QRE , the price commensurately to PRE , and the amount paid to these genera-
tors, to aefg. The difference in payments to displaced generators is the shaded area of Fig. (1).
Of this reduced payment, one component consists of real costs not incurred, gfcd representing
avoided variable/fuel costs, while the other component, bcfe representing infra-marginal rent, is
an avoided payment to generators for the fixed costs of the capacity in service.
The first component is identical in concept to the fuel cost savings discussed in Section 2.4
above. The second is a transfer payment, which may or may not be passed on to final consumers
depending on the regulations governing the prices paid by final consumers and provisions for
maintaining unused capacity on line. For instance, if the regulatory system guarantees the re-
covery of fixed costs for generators and abcd is the amount that fully compensates generators for
fixed and variable costs of existing capacity, then payments for fixed costs must increase with
increased RE injections. Alternatively, if the recovery of fixed costs is not guaranteed, the loss
incurred by generators will lead to the retirement of existing unused capacity or a higher thresh-
old price for building new capacity. In fact, the loss of this infra-marginal rent is the origin of
the debate about the need for capacity markets or alternative capacity payments to maintain suf-
ficient dispatchable capacity to meet load in the presence of intermittent generation. These are
payments for the difference between the capacities that would not be needed should RE gener-
ation be dispatchable and that which would no longer be needed notwithstanding intermittency,
which is reflected in the capacity credit discussed in Section (2.6) above.
In our cost accounting, we do not include this component of the saving due to the merit
order effect on the basis that either it will not be realized at the retail level because of regulatory
treatment or some other arrangement will be devised to maintain sufficient capacity to meet
demand at all times, and that the capacity credit captures whatever savings are to be achieved as
a result of reduced capacity needs. Our treatment is much simpler than including the full merit
order effect and then estimating substitute capacity payments. We start from the point that
however adequate the current system of compensation to generators without RE is, equivalent
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compensation will need to be maintained in one form or another for all capacity except that
represented by the capacity credit.
3 Methodology
This section presents the details of the methodology used in calculating the annual costs and
cost savings of wind and solar energy in Germany for the period 2006-2010.
3.1 Remuneration to generators
The relevant law in Germany (EEG) provides producers of RE a 20-year guaranteed fixed FIT
(in addition to generation in the year of installation), which is different for wind and solar
energy. Power producers of wind energy receive an initial high tariff for a period ranging from
a minimum of 5 years up to 20 years, and a final low tariff (about 60% lower) for the remaining
period.3 The length of the initial period depends on the characteristics of the power plant. Plant-
specific data on how long the producers receive the high tariff are not available, but according
to the 2011 EEG-Progress Report published by the German government (BMU, 2011), more
than half of the power plants receive the initial tariff payment over 20 years and more than
three-quarters at least for 15 years. The level of the initial and final tariffs depends on the year
of installation of the turbines and both are annually reduced by a fixed percentage. For example,
wind energy generated by on-shore power plants installed in 2010, is remunerated by an initial
and final FIT that are 1% lower than for the energy generated by the power plants installed in
2009.
With regard to FIT for solar energy, producers receive a fixed tariff for 20 years. For the
period 2000-2003, the level was the same for all solar power plants; from 2004 on, it depends
on the characteristics and location of the installation. As for wind, the levels of solar FIT for
new installed capacity are annually reduced by a fixed percentage. The levels and the annual
reductions of solar and wind FIT were first defined in year 2000 and subsequently revised in
2004, 2009 and recently in 2011. Table 1 shows the levels of FIT for new installed capacity for
the period 2000-2010 (EEG, 2000, 2004, 2009). It also shows the total annual FIT expenditure,
that is, the total amount spent annually for solar and wind FIT.4 All FIT are nominal.
Since the FIT diminishes in value over time both in nominal and real terms, taking the
amount paid for the FIT in a given year would make wind energy appear more expensive in the
first years of activities, when the payments are relatively generous, and cheaper in the following
years. Consequently, the structure of payments over time requires some equalization to avoid
over- and understating cost in the early and later years of the facilities life. We do so in the
following way for all capacity installed in a given year.
First, we assume a 25-year lifetime for all solar and wind power plants (IEA/NEA, 2010)
and estimate remuneration for each vintage based on observed wind or solar generation in each
year through 2010 assuming equal annual capacity factors for each in-service vintage and based
on an assumed capacity factor for the remaining years of activity of that vintage.5 Then, that
stream of payments is discounted at the fixed rate of 7% and summed to get an initial Net
3The length of the initial period is 5 years for on-shore power plants, 9 years for off-shore power plants com-
missioned before year 2004, and 12 years for off-shore power plants commissioned afterword.
4Data for the total annual expenditure are provided by the German TSOs: www.eeg-
kwk.net/de/EEG_Jahresabrechnungen.htm.
5We assume that all capacity is installed on the first of January.
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Wind 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
On-shore IT [¢/kWh] 9.10 9.10 8.96 8.83 8.70 8.53 8.36 8.19 8.02 9.20 9.11FT [¢/kWh] 6.19 6.19 6.10 6.01 5.50 5.39 5.28 5.18 5.07 5.02 4.97
Off-shore IT [¢/kWh] 9.10 9.10 8.96 8.83 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 8.92 15.00 15.00FT [¢/kWh] 6.19 6.19 6.10 6.01 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.07 3.50 3.50
Expenditure [Bne] 1.44 1.70 2.30 2.44 2.73 3.51 3.56 3.39 3.34
Solar 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Minimum rate [¢/kWh] 50.62 50.62 48.09 45.68 45.70 43.42 41.24 39.18 37.22 31.94 28.43
Maximum rate [¢/kWh] 50.62 50.62 48.09 45.68 57.40 54.53 51.80 49.21 46.75 43.01 39.14
Expenditure [Bne] 0.08 0.15 0.28 0.68 1.18 1.60 2.22 3.16 5.09
Table 1: wind and solar FIT. IT: initial tariff; FR: final tariff. Expenditure: total annual
expenditure for wind and solar FIT. The level of the solar FIT depends on the capacity and
location of the solar plant and goes between the Minimum rate and Maximum rate. All the
data are in nominal value. Sources: for the level of the FIT, elaboration from EEG (2000,
2004, 2009); for the expenditures data are provided by the German TSOs. To our knowledge
there are no data publicly available on the total expenditure for wind and solar FIT for the
period 2000-2001. Data are in nominal value.
Present Value (NPV) of all the remunerations.6 Finally, the resulting NPV is converted into a
mortgage-like equal annual remuneration by redistributing it over 25 years. We assume that all
the installations built before year 2000 (about 4GW for wind and 32MW for solar) were com-
missioned in year 2000.7 The equalized remuneration for all turbines in a given year consists of
the sum of the equalized payments to each vintage of capacity in service that year. For example,
the equalized remuneration for year 2006 is given by the sum of the annualized payments of the
vintages built between year 2000 and year 2006 as all capacity constructed from 2000 is still in
activity in 2006. All remunerations are calculated in e(2011) in order to take into account in-
flation. For the period 2000-2011 the average annual historical CPI rate of the German Federal
Statistical Office is used (see Table 15),8 while from 2012 we assume a constant rate of 2% (the
average annual inflation in Germany in 1990-2011 was 2.17%).
Table 2 shows the annually installed wind and solar capacities and the amount of electric-
ity generated. For the period from 2010 to the end of the lifetime of the plants, we assume that
all power plants have the same capacity factor equal to 18.0% for wind and 8.1% for solar, as
the average capacity factors in 2006-2010.
The price of electricity paid to wind and solar energy depends on the level of FIT for the
first 20 years of activity, after that power plants receive remuneration from selling electricity
into the market. We assume that the market price of electricity is e50/MWh in real terms
(average electricity price 2006-2011 was e47.7/MWh). Due to inflation, the real level of the
FIT decreases annually. If it goes below the assumed electricity price, the power producers
sell electricity in the market. In other words, producers receive at least e50/MWh of energy
generated.
6The existing literature on cost of generation electricity generally uses a cost of capital between 5% and
10% (IEA/NEA, 2010).
7This assumption is justified because the capacity built before year 2000 was low compared to the capacity
constructed between 2000 and 2010 (especially with regard to solar energy), and because the EEG gives FIT also
to power plants built before 2000 as if they were commissioned in 2000.
8www.destatis.de.
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Wind 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total capacity [GW] 6.1 8.8 12.0 14.6 16.6 18.4 20.6 22.2 23.8 25.7 27.2
Installed capacity [GW] 1.7 2.7 3.2 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.5
Wind electricity [TWh] 9.5 10.5 15.8 18.7 25.5 27.2 30.7 39.7 40.6 38.7 37.8
Off-shore electricity [GWh] 38 174
Solar 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total capacity [MW] 76 186 296 435 1105 2056 2899 4170 6120 9914 17320
Installed capacity [MW] 44 110 110 139 670 951 843 1271 1950 3794 7406
Solar electricity [GWh] 64 76 162 313 556 1282 2220 3075 4420 6583 11683
Table 2: Total capacity: total installed capacity; Installed capacity: annual installed capac-
ity; Wind electricity: total final electricity produced by wind energy; Off-shore electricity:
total final electricity produced by off-shore wind energy; Solar electricity: total final elec-
tricity produced by solar energy. Source: BMU (2012).
With regard to FIT for wind energy, for the period 2000-2010 our assumption is that all
wind power plants received the initial high FIT.9 For the years after 2010, it is assumed that
50% of power plants receive the initial high tariff for 20 years and the other 50% for 15 years.
In addition to this scenario, which is called Medium FIT, Section 4.2 shows the generation cost
for two other FIT scenarios. Regarding FIT for solar energy, we assume that the average FIT
earned by all newly installed solar capacity in its first year of activity would be the same for all
20 years. Additionally details on the calculation are in Appendices A and B.
Table 3 shows the results for the equalized remuneration and the total annual expenditures
for FIT for wind and solar energy for the period 2006-2010. For wind, the results refer to the
Medium FIT scenario. The level of remuneration to generators increases over the years with
the increase of wind and solar capacity and our equalized remuneration is always lower than
the actual annual expenditures for FIT, except in 2010 for wind when the wind capacity factor
was especially low. Actual annual expenditure for FIT depends on the amount of RE generated,
and therefore on the actual capacity factor in contrast to the life-time average capacity factor
assumed in the calculation of equalized remuneration. While the wind capacity factor was lower
in 2010 (15.9%), it was higher in 2007 and 2008 (20.43% and 19.43%). Consequently, in Table
3 equalized remuneration is lower than the expenditure for FIT in 2007-2008 and higher in
2010.
3.2 Fuels cost saving and carbon cost saving
For the estimation of the fuel cost saving and carbon cost saving we make use of the model
of Weigt et al. (2012). The model is a deterministic unit commitment model of the German
electricity market for the period 2006-2010. It was developed to estimate the CO2 emission
abatement due to RE, which is calculated as the difference in total CO2 emissions in the ob-
servable (OBS) scenario, which corresponds to the historical scenario, and the counterfactual
scenarios wherein no energy would have been produced by the relevant form of RE (eg., No
Wind or No Solar).
The model minimizes total generation costs, including start-up cost, on an hourly time
frame and it is calibrated to reproduce observed yearly generation by fuel. The generation cost
9For the years 2002-2010, the difference between the total annual wind remuneration based on this assumption
and the total historical expenditures for FIT of Table 1 is no higher than 0.5%.
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Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Expenditure for FIT [Me] 2979 3737 3696 3512 3419
Equalized remuneration [Me] 2676 2864 3047 3281 3476
% 90% 77% 82% 93% 102%
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Expenditure for FIT [Me] 1282 1702 2303 3266 5207
Equalized remuneration [Me] 966 1351 1893 2882 4503
% 75% 79% 82% 88% 86%
Table 3: wind and solar generation costs. Expenditure for FIT: total annual expenditure
for the wind and solar FIT (cf. Table 1). Equalized remuneration: annual equalized remu-
neration. %: percentage of Equalized remuneration vs. Expenditure for FIT. Data are in
Me(2011).
and the hourly demand, as well as technical parameters, are exogenous while the electricity
price and the dispatching schedule are endogenous. Perfect competition and perfect foresight
of load and RE injections are assumed. The model dataset use detailed information on all
conventional facilities in Germany with more than 100 MW generation capacity by plant and
fuel types, and aggregated information for smaller power plants. Data come from VGE (2005,
2006, 2009), Umweltbundesamt (2011), Eurelectric (2010) and company reports. Marginal
generation costs consist of fuel and emission costs. The prices for oil, gas, and coal come from
the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA, 2011). In all scenarios the EU ETS
carbon price is exogenous and equal to the historical values. The carbon prices used are monthly
average EUA prices from the European Energy Exchange (EEX). Data for start-up cost and shut
down times come from DENA (2005), Schröter (2004). The model considers differences in
plant efficiencies due to the different life-time of the plants as in Schröter (2004), but does not
take into account efficiency losses due to lower utilization due to renewable injection. Demand
level accounts for import and export and is based on data from ENTSO-E (2011). Data for
hourly wind input are provided by the four German network operators. Data for solar and
biomass injections are not available for the full time frame and an average monthly profile has
been estimated based on the hourly injection levels provided for the East German region by the
TSO 50Hertz Transmission. Consequently, the model accounts for the high variability of wind
injection but not for solar variations. Biomass is running with a relative constant profile. The
model has been calibrated by modifying the marginal generation costs of coal and gas plants
and the availability factors. For more details see Weigt et al. (2012).
Table 4 presents the total annual CO2 emissions and the fuel and carbon costs in the OBS,
No Wind and No Solar scenarios. Fuel cost consists of the expenditure for buying fuels for coal,
gas, nuclear and lignite generation. The total annual CO2 emissions reduction, fuel cost saving
and carbon cost saving are calculated by taking the values of the emissions and costs in the No
Wind and No Solar scenarios and subtracting those in the OBS scenario.
3.3 Additional start-up cost
Regarding cycling costs, the model of Weigt et al. (2012) considers only start-up costs, which is
the cost of the additional fuel needed to start-up the plant.10 As it was done for fuel cost saving,
10The model considers start-up restrictions for coal and lignite fired steam plants of several hours downtime
while gas turbines have no start-up restrictions. It also assumes that all plants can technically be shut down after
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Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CO2 emissions
OBS [MtCO2] 307 318 297 282 287
No Wind [MtCO2] 329 344 329 312 314
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 22 26 32 30 27
Fuel cost
OBS [Me] 10621 10622 13875 10423 11111
No Wind [Me] 11726 12104 15718 11705 12433
Fuel cost saving [Me] 1105 1482 1843 1281 1322
Carbon cost
OBS [Me] 5302 192 5090 3733 4276
No Wind [Me] 5651 221 5513 4121 4668
Carbon cost saving [Me] 350 29 422 388 393
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CO2 emissions
OBS [MtCO2] 307 318 297 282 287
No Solar [MtCO2] 308 320 301 287 295
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 2 2 4 5 7
Fuel cost
OBS [Me] 10621 10622 13875 10423 11111
No Solar [Me] 10719 10739 14080 10649 11519
Fuel cost saving [Me] 98 117 205 226 407
Carbon cost
OBS [Me] 5302 192 5090 3733 4276
No Solar [Me] 5327 193 5168 3795 4386
Carbon cost saving [Me] 26 1 78 63 110
Table 4: total annual CO2 emission reduction, fuel cost saving, and carbon cost saving due
to wind and solar energy. Data are in nominal value.
we calculate the additional start-up cost due to wind(solar) as the difference of start-up costs in
the OBS scenario and No Wind(No Solar) scenario, Table 5.
In most of the years, the start-up costs are lower in the observed scenario than in the sce-
narios without wind and solar energy. This unexpected result probably reflects the assumption
of perfect foresight with respect to the intermittent RE injections, which would allow for an
optimal utilization of the existing generation fleet. In fact, plants continuing in service do expe-
rience greater start-up costs; there are just fewer plants starting up and shutting down than when
no intermittent generation is present. Still, the start-up costs in all scenarios are much lower
than the avoided fossil fuel cost (less than 2%). If we could better estimate the start-up cost and
also add all the other cycling cost, these figures would surely be higher; however, they would
likely remain much lower than the avoided fuel cost. Likewise the additional cycling cost of
wind and solar would remain much lower than the fuel cost saving, and our results would not
one hour of operation, and does not consider externally defined minimum run-time.
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Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
start-up cost
OBS 173 156 212 199 207
No Wind 178 169 217 197 203
Additional start-up cost -5 -13 -5 2 4
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
start-up cost
OBS 173 156 212 199 207
No Solar 175 159 213 209 207
Addition start-up cost -2 -3 -1 -9 0
Table 5: Additional start-up cost due to wind and solar energy. Data are in nominal value.
change much if all cycling costs could be added to our analysis.
3.4 Wind capacity saving
The model of Weigt et al. (2012) does not take into account the renewable capacity credit and it
considers the amount of conventional generation capacity in the No Wind and No Solar scenarios
to be the same as in the OBS scenario. In order to estimate the capacity benefit we must estimate
how much, when and which kind of conventional capacity is displaced because of the additional
wind generation. This kind of assessment would require a detailed analysis of the development
of the German system in the next years, which goes beyond the scope of this study. We will
therefore estimate the capacity benefit for wind only, based on results from existing literature
and on simple and transparent assumptions. Our goal is not so much an accurate calculation
of the capacity saving as it is an estimation of its order of magnitude in comparison with other
costs and cost savings. We do not calculate the capacity saving for solar energy. As shown in
the Section 4.2 the magnitudes concerning solar energy are such that the capacity credit will
have little bearing on the final abatement cost.
In order to estimate the cost savings for wind from capacity no longer required, we assume
that the capacity installed up to 2010 would provide a credit of 7%. One study (DENA, 2005)
shows a capacity credit of 6-8% in Germany for wind capacity of 14.5GW, while a capacity of
36GW would have a capacity credit 5-6%. Considering than in 2010 there was a wind capacity
of 27GW, a 7% capacity credit is a realistic value. We assume that these cost savings from all
wind capacity built before 2010 are realized in 2015. This means that in Germany, in 2015
the constructed conventional capacity will be lower by 7% of the wind capacity installed in the
period 2000-2010 than it would be otherwise. We suppose that the wind capacity credit will
substitute 70% of coal and 30% of gas. Coal is displaced more than gas because wind power
plants need flexible gas-fired generation to cope with wind fluctuations. In order to make an
estimation of the economic benefit, we calculate the savings in capital cost and fixed O&M
cost of the conventional plants displaced by the wind capacity credit. For the O&M cost, we
consider all the years when wind generators are active (envisaging the lifetime of a wind turbine
of 25 years). For example, in 2006 about 2GW of wind capacity was installed which will last up
to 2031. This wind capacity provides a capacity credit of 120MW. As a result, we assume that
in 2015, investment in 84MW of coal capacity and 36MW of gas capacity will not be needed
and that from 2015 to 2031 the corresponding fixed O&M costs will not be spent because of the
wind power plants installed in 2006. As is done for the equalized remuneration to generators,
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the NPV of these savings is calculated by discounting and summing them up to the year of
installation of the wind capacity at a 7% cost of capital. Subsequently, we annualize them over
the lifetime of the wind power plant by redistributing the NPV in a 25 years mortgage using
the same interest rate to spread this cost savings over all the tons of CO2 abated over the life
of the turbine. Finally the total cost savings for a given year is provided by the sum of the
mortgage rates of the capacity in service in that year. For overnight cost, data are from NEA
(2011) (e1978/kW for coal and e883/kW for gas in e(2011)), as to fixed O&M cost, data are
from EIA (2010) (e29/kW for coal and e11/kW for gas in e(2011)). We consider a capacity
factor of 85% both for coal and gas (IEA/NEA, 2010). Table 6 shows the cost savings due to
the capacity credit and the components due to the avoided capital and O&M cost. The increase
of these cost savings over the years reflects the increase of wind capacity.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Capital cost saving 95 106 117 130 142
O&M cost saving 10 12 13 15 16
Capacity saving 106 117 130 145 158
Table 6: wind capacity saving. Capital cost saving: annualized capital cost saving; O&M
cost saving: annualized fixed O&M cost saving; Capacity saving: sum of Capital cost
saving and O&M cost saving. Data are in Me(2011).
3.5 Additional balancing cost for wind
The model of Weigt et al. (2012) considers perfect foresight of load and RE and does not
take into account balancing cost. However, a number of studies have examined the additional
balancing cost due to wind energy. Estimations are in the order of e1-4/MWh of wind energy
at wind penetrations of up to 20% (Holttinen, 2008).11 GreenNet project estimates a cost of
Germany of e2 per MWh of wind energy with a 10% wind penetration by comparing the
system operational costs in a simulation model run with stochastic wind power forecasts and
in the same model where the equivalent wind production is predictable and constant (Meibom
et al., 2006). We use this value for our assessment of the balancing cost. As for the capacity
saving, our goal is not so much an accurate calculation of the additional balancing cost as it is
an estimation of its order of magnitude in comparison with other costs and cost savings. Table
7 shows the balancing cost for wind. As is done for the capacity credit, we do not show this
value for solar energy.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Balancing cost per MWh of wind energy [e/MWh] 2 2 2 2 2
Wind energy generated [TWh] 31 40 41 38 36
Additional balancing cost [Me] 61 79 81 75 72
Table 7: additional balancing cost for wind. Data are in Me(2011).
11In the period 2006-2010 wind penetration in Germany did not exceed 7%.
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4 Results and comments
This Section presents the results of our analysis. Section 4.1 presents and comments on the CO2
abatement costs of wind and solar energy while Sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss the robustness of
these results. Section 4.2 presents the impact on the final results of the assumptions made to
calculate the different costs and benefits, with particular attention to remuneration to generators.
Section 4.3 discusses the impact of the learning rate on the CO2 abatement costs of wind energy.
4.1 CO2 abatement costs
Table 8 shows annual CO2 abatement costs as a result of the injection of wind and solar energy
into the system in total and in Euro per tCO2. The net cost is given by the sum of all the costs and
cost savings. Average is the average annual CO2 abatement costs weighted over CO2 emission
reductions. Positive numbers refer to costs, negative numbers refer to cost savings. The per
tonne cost is the net cost for the year divided by the simulated quantity of CO2 emissions
reduced in that year. For wind energy, results are for the Medium FIT scenario. Figs. 2 and 3
show these same costs and cost savings graphically per tCO2 abated and per MWh of RE
injection (Table 1), respectively. Costs are above zero, cost savings are below and the black
bars indicate the CO2 abatement cost in Fig. 2 and the total cost per MWh of RE injection in
Fig. 3. All data are in e(2011).
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Equalized remuneration [Me] 2676 2864 3047 3281 3476
Additional start-up cost [Me] -6 -14 -5 2 4
Additional balancing cost [Me] 61 79 81 77 76
Fuel cost saving [Me] -1204 -1578 -1913 -1326 -1352
Carbon cost saving [Me] -381 -31 -438 -402 -402
Capacity saving [Me] -106 -117 -130 -145 -158
Net cost [Me] 1017 1178 616 1461 1615
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 22 26 32 30 27
Abatement cost [e/tCO2] 47 47 20 50 62 44
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Equalized remuneration [Me] 966 1351 1893 2882 4503
Additional start-up cost [Me] -2 -3 -1 -10 0
Fuel cost saving [Me] -107 -124 -212 -234 -417
Carbon cost saving [Me] -28 -1 -81 -65 -113
Net cost [Me] 829 1223 1599 2574 3973
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 2 2 4 5 7
Abatement cost [e/tCO2] 552 627 439 557 547 537
Table 8: CO2 abatement cost of wind and solar energy. Equalized remuneration: see Ta-
ble 3; Additional start-up cost, Fuel cost saving, Carbon cost saving and CO2 emission
reduction: see Table 4; Capacity saving: see Table 6; Balancing cost: see Table 7; Net
cost: sum of all the costs and cost savings; Abatement cost: Net cost divided CO2 emis-
sion reduction; Average: average annual CO2 abatement costs weighted over CO2 emission
reductions. Data are in e(2011).
Three main results can be drawn.
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Figure 2: (a): costs and cost savings of wind energy per tCO2 abated. (b): costs and
cost savings of solar energy per tCO2 abated. Costs are positive numbers, cost savings are
negative numbers. Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
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Figure 3: (a): costs and cost savings of wind energy per MWh of wind energy generated;
(b): costs and cost savings of solar energy per MWh of solar energy generated. Costs are
positive numbers, cost savings are negative numbers. Data are in e(2011)/MWh.
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1. There is a large disparity among different costs and cost savings. Equalized remuneration
to generators is by far the largest cost; the additional start-up cost and the balancing cost
represent just a few percentage of it. Fuel cost saving is the largest savings while carbon
cost saving and the capacity saving are much lower although not irrelevant. Fig. (2)
clearly shows that net costs are mostly determined by the remuneration to generators and
the fuel cost savings. The other costs and benefits are much smaller (start-up costs are too
small to appear in the Figures). Note that the vertical scale for the cost of solar energy
is different than that for wind energy because of the significantly higher remuneration to
solar generators.
2. There is a large difference between the abatement costs of wind and solar energy. While
the CO2 abatement costs for wind are of the order of tens of e/tCO2, the abatement costs
for solar are of the order of hundreds of e/tCO2. Fuel cost savings per tCO2 are similar
for wind and solar energy, being slightly higher for solar than for wind since solar energy
is used during the day at peak demand and it displaces mostly gas, while wind is active
all day and it displaces gas as well as coal. Comparing these results with the historical
annual average EU ETS carbon price, Table 9, the CO2 abatement costs of wind tend to
be higher than EUA prices but of the same order of magnitude (the price of allowances
reached levels of e30/tCO2 in April 2006). Moreover, in year 2008 the annual CO2
abatement cost was very close to the average carbon price. On the other hand, abatement
costs for solar are always much above any possible realistic prices for the EUA.
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Figure 4: (a): wind fuel cost saving per MWh of wind energy generated and annual average
fossil fuel prices. Source for fuel prices: BAFA (2011). Data are in e(2011)/MWh; (b):
wind carbon cost saving per MWh of wind energy and EUA average annual price. Data are
in e(2011)/tCO2. Source for carbon price: EEX.
3. CO2 abatement cost can change considerably from year to year, particularly for wind
where variations by a factor of two can be observed. These changes in net cost mostly
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
EUA 18.9 0.7 12.4 13.6 14.7 10.7
Table 9: average annual EUA price. Data are in e(2011)/tCO2. Source: EEX.
reflect changes in annual fuel cost saving and carbon cost saving, which are correlated
with variations of fossil fuel prices and the carbon price. Fig. (4 - a) presents wind fuel
cost saving per MWh of wind energy and the annual average price of coal, gas and oil.
Fig. (4 - b) shows carbon cost saving per tCO2 and the annual average EUA price. In
contrast, the remuneration to generators is relatively constant.
4.2 Sensitivity analyses
The results presented in Section 4.1 refer to the base case scenario that considers a 2% future
rate of inflation, e50/MWh future electricity price and a 7% cost of capital. Table (10) shows
the annual CO2 abatement cost of wind under different assumptions regarding the remuneration
to generators. The results presented above for wind are from the Medium FIT scenario where
50% of power plants are assumed to receive the initial high tariff for 20 years and the remaining
50% for 15 years. In the High FIT scenario we suppose that all the power plants receive the
high tariff for 20 years, and all the power plants installed from the year 2009 receive the extra
bonus.12 In the Low FIT scenario we suppose that 50% of power plants receive the high tariff
for 20 years, 25% for 15 years and the remaining 25% for 5 years for on-shore power plants
and 12 years for off-shore intallations. Table 10 shows that CO2 abatement cost of wind do not
differ considerably under these scenarios. On average, they go from a minimum of e38/tCO2
in the Low FIT scenario with 5% cost of capital, up to a maximum ofe51/tCO2 in the High FIT
scenario with 10% cost of capital. Results under different scenarios are very close to each other
because most of the variations in remuneration affect future revenues, which are discounted.
Table 11 shows the annual CO2 abatement cost of wind under different assumptions re-
garding the capacity credit, it presents two extreme cases of 0% and 20% capacity credit, in
addition to the base case of a 7% capacity credit. The higher the capacity credit, the greater the
cost savings, and the lower the CO2 abatement costs. Average annual CO2 abatement cost is
e57/tCO2 with 0% capacity credit and e43/tCO2 with 20% capacity credit. This analysis con-
firms the result that, even if wind capacity benefit is not irrelevant to determine CO2 abatement
costs, its impact is not predominant.
Table 12 shows the annual CO2 abatement cost of solar under different assumptions re-
garding the remuneration to generators. Base case assumptions are the same as for wind. Also
for solar, results do not differ considerably from the base case scenario. They go from a mini-
mum average CO2 abatement cost of e521/tCO2 in the scenario with 5% cost of capital up to
e562/tCO2 in the scenarios with 10% cost of capital.
We did not calculate the capacity saving and additional balancing cost for solar, however
their impact on the final results would be very small. To show it, we suppose that solar energy
has the same additional balancing cost and capacity saving than wind in absolute term, that is
the same values shown in Table 8. This is a large overestimation as total solar capacity is about
two thirds than wind capacity, and solar capacity factor is less than half with respect to wind
capacity factor. Nevertheless, under these generous conditions the average solar annual CO2
12From year 2009 there is a technological bonus of ¢0.5/kWh for on-shore wind, and ¢2/kWh for off-shore
wind.
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Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Base case
Low FIT 44 44 18 48 59 42
Medium FIT 47 47 20 50 62 44
High FIT 49 49 22 53 65 46
1% inflation
Low FIT 46 46 20 50 61 43
Medium FIT 48 48 22 52 64 46
High FIT 51 50 24 55 68 49
e40/MWh electricity price
Low FIT 43 43 17 46 57 40
Medium FIT 45 45 19 48 60 43
High FIT 47 47 21 51 63 45
e70/MWh electricity price
Low FIT 50 50 23 54 66 47
Medium FIT 51 51 24 55 67 48
High FIT 51 51 24 55 68 49
5% cost of capital
Low FIT 41 42 15 44 54 38
Medium FIT 43 43 17 47 58 41
High FIT 47 47 20 50 62 44
10% cost of capital
Low FIT 49 50 22 52 63 46
Medium FIT 51 51 24 55 67 49
High FIT 53 53 25 56 69 51
Table 10: CO2 abatement cost of wind under different scenario regarding remuneration to
generators; 1% inflation: 1% future rate of inflation after 2011 inflation; e40/MWh electric-
ity price: e40/MWh future electricity price; e70/MWh electricity price: e70/MWh future
electricity price; 5% cost of capital: cost of capital of 5%; 10% cost of capital: cost of cap-
ital of 10%. Results presented in Section 4.1 are for the Base case - Medium FIT scenario.
Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
0% capacity credit 64 48 34 64 77 57
7% capacity credit 47 47 20 50 62 44
20% capacity credit 50 35 23 50 60 43
Table 11: CO2 abatement costs with different values of capacity credit. Results presented
in Section 4.1 are with 7% capacity credit. Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
abatement cost would only increase of less than 7% if we added the additional abatement cost
and would decrease of less than 4% if we added capacity saving, remaining on average always
around e500/tCO2.
As explained earlier, the unchanged EUA price that we use to calculate carbon cost sav-
ings is surely too low, but we can find no modeling that provides an estimate of the changes in
demand for allowances on the EUA price. Nevertheless, for purposes of a sensitivity analysis,
assumptions can be made. Wind injections in Germany reduced CO2 emissions by amount that
varied between 7% and 10% of what emissions from the German electricity sector would have
been (cf. Table 4), and the demand for allowances in the EU ETS by an amount that was ap-
proximately 1% of the two billion ton cap. Even if it could be assumed that a 1% change in
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Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Base case 552 627 439 557 547 537
1% inflation 568 647 456 582 576 561
e0/MWh electricity price 546 620 433 550 539 530
e40/MWh electricity price 551 625 438 556 545 536
e70/MWh electricity price 554 629 441 560 550 540
5% cost of capital 534 608 424 540 530 521
10% cost of capital 578 655 460 583 572 562
Table 12: CO2 abatement cost of solar under different scenarios regarding remuneration to
generators; 1% inflation: 1% future rate of inflation after 2011 inflation; e40/MWh electric-
ity price: e40/MWh future electricity price; e70/MWh electricity price: e70/MWh future
electricity price; 5% cost of capital: cost of capital of 5%; 10% cost of capital: cost of
capital of 10%. Results presented in Section 4.1 are for the Base case scenario. Data are in
e(2011)/tCO2.
demand would have a 10% effect on the EUA price, our results would not change greatly, as
can be verified by making the appropriate adjustment to Table 8. In most years, the result would
be to reduce the per ton cost by about two euros. Of course, we are considering Germany alone
and Germany is only one part of an EU-wide policy to promote RE. That EU-wide effect would
clearly be larger, but we hesitate to hazard a guess in the absence of both estimates of the EU-
wide reduction in demand for allowances due to RE policy and much modeling or estimation of
the relationship between changes in demand for EUAs and the effect on price.
All sensitivity analyses performed show that annual CO2 abatement cost for wind remains
of the order of few tens of e/tCO2 while CO2 abatement cost for solar remains of the order of
hundreds of e/tCO2.
4.3 Learning effect
A frequent argument in favor of subsidies for the development of RE development is the learn-
ing effect: future costs will be less because of learning-by-doing from today’s subsidized de-
ployment. We have not included this potential cost savings because of the strong required as-
sumption that the future cost savings can be attributed to the deployment in one specific country
when learning is notoriously international. There is, in addition, another attribution problem:
to which vintage(s) are future cost savings attributed? Alternatively, when are learning effects
from a particular investment exhausted and how are they realized over time?
Also to be noted is that the level of remuneration to RE generators in Germany assumes
a considerable degree of cost reduction over time as indicated by Table 1. For instance and
taking wind as the example, the level of the initial FIT decreased from ¢9.10/kWh in 2000 to
¢8.02/kWh in 2008, or by almost 12% in nominal terms. In real terms the FIT declined by 23%
or at an annual rate of about 3.3%. It is evident from the various adjustments in the initial tariff
and the rate of decline over the years, that the regulator has had a hard time getting this right.
Still, even after the notable adjustment in 2009, when the initial FIT was increased by 15% to
¢9.20/kWh, the real level of the initial FIT was 12% lower than the 2000 level for a real rate of
decrease in remuneration of about 1.5% per annum.
If the attribution problems can be overcome so that the anticipated cost reductions in
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future years can be credited to current and past deployments, a methodology similar to that
employed for calculating the savings from the capacity benefit can be used. We assume that
when there was the annual reduction of FIT for new installed capacity, it was all due to the
learning rate coming from the capacity built in Germany in the previous year. As an illustrative
example, we take the capacity put in place in 2010 and assume that the nominal ¢0.9/kWh
reduction in the initial FIT for 2011 is continued for future years and that the resulting cost
savings can be attributed to the 2010 investment. We also assume that 2 GW of additional
capacity is built annually with a capacity factor of 18% over the 25-year life of this capacity.
The cost savings over the 25-year life of this capacity is then discounted at 7% and summed to
a NPV in the initial year of that vintage and then amortized over the output of the 25-year life
as is done for the capacity credit. We assume that the learning effects are exhausted in years
2020, this is the last year in which the cost savings from future capacity can be attributed to the
2010 investment. The same calculations are repeated for all vintages of capacity since 2001.13
These assumptions are very generous as we have neglected that the level of FIT has in-
creased in the past, and might increase again. Notwithstanding, the resulting potential annual
cost savings is on average no more than e9/tCO2. This is not an insignificant figure, but it
does not change the basic conclusion that the primary determinants of the cost of abating CO2
emissions through promoting RE energy are the remuneration to generators and the fuel cost
savings from the avoided fossil-energy generation and that the cost of abatement is in the tens
of Euro per tCO2 for wind and therefore generally higher than the observed price of CO2 in the
EU ETS even if learning effects are included.
5 Conclusions
This paper estimates the annual CO2 abatement costs of wind and solar energy in Germany
for the years 2006-2010. The CO2 abatement cost resulting from RE is calculated as the ratio
of the net cost over the CO2 emission reductions attributed to RE. The CO2 abatement cost
of wind for 2006-2010 is on average e43/tCO2, higher than the historical EU ETS carbon
price but of the same order of magnitude. On the contrary, the CO2 abatement cost of solar is
very high, the average for 2006-2010 is e537/tCO2, much above any possible realistic carbon
price. The main cost component is the remuneration to generators determined by the FIT. In
comparison, the additional start-up cost and balancing cost are quite small, if not negligible.
The main cost saving comes from the avoided fuel cost of the electricity generation displaced
by the RE. The other cost saving components -the carbon cost saving and the capacity benefit-
are smaller but not irrelevant, particularly in the case of wind. The CO2 abatement cost has
changed considerably over the years due to variations in fossil fuels prices, carbon price and the
amount of generated RE. The year 2008 is the one with the lowest CO2 abatement cost due to
a combination of high fossil fuel prices and, with regard to wind energy, a high annual capacity
factor. Under several sensitivity analyses, CO2 abatement costs always remain of the order of
few tens e/tCO2 for wind energy, while for solar energy are always above e500/tCO2.
Our analysis only looks at the impact of RE on power generation. We do not take into
account costs or cost savings beyond the busbar and we could not incorporate all the cycling
costs due to the intermittency of wind and solar energy. Moreover, our analysis did not take
into consideration the interaction of the renewable policy support with the EU ETS. Based on
13Although in year 2009 there was an increase of FIT, we assume that the capacity built in year 2008 is respon-
sible of a cost saving of ¢1.6/kWh as in year 2007.
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the assumption that without RE the carbon price would be higher, the interaction will increase
the benefit of carbon saving and decrease the CO2 abatement cost of wind and solar energy.
Our study suggests that if we look at RE only as a climate instrument, and at renewable
incentives only as a policy to abate CO2 emissions, the German support for wind energy has
induced a reduction of CO2 emissions at a carbon price generally higher than the historically
observed EUA price, but on the same order of magnitude especially if we could reliably estimate
the effect of the RE injections on the price observed in the EU ETS. On the contrary, supporting
solar energy through deployment incentives has proven to be a very expensive way of reducing
CO2 emissions.
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Appendices
A Wind annualized economic cost
This appendix shows in details the calculations of the equalized remuneration for wind energy
in the Medium FIT scenario. Table 13 shows the estimated annual electricity produced by each
vintage of capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. The years in the first horizontal axis represent
the years of installation, while the ones in the first vertical axis are the years of production.
Each column shows the annual energy produced in 25 years (the assumed lifetime of wind
power plants) by the capacity installed in the year marked in the first row. The entries in the
rows are calculated in the following way: for the period 2000-2010 we allocate the historical
annual electricity generated by wind (shown in Table 2) to power plants installed in different
years by assuming a constant annual capacity factor; as from 2010 up to the end of the lifetime
of the power plants a constant capacity factor of 18% is assumed.
Table 14 shows the annual real price of electricity for wind power plants that receive the
initial high FIT for 20 years. As before, the years in the first horizontal axis are the years of
installation of the power plant, while the ones in the first vertical axis are the years of production.
Results take into account inflation, up to year 2011 the annual historical CPI rate of the German
Federal Statistical Office is used (Table 15),14 from 2012 we assume a constant rate of 2%. All
results are in e(2011). Each column shows the annual electricity price paid to wind energy
generated by the capacity installed in the year marked at in first row; the values are calculated
by inflating the nominal annual level of FIT (cf. Table 1) for the first 20 years of activities. For
the last 5 years of activity, and when the real level of FIT goes below the assumed market price
of e50/MWh, the power producers sell electricity at the market price. Table 16 is analogous to
Table 14 but for power plants who receive the initial high FIT only for 15 years.
14www.destatis.de.
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Table 17 shows the annual remunerations in the Medium FIT scenario (where we suppose
that 50% of power plants receive the initial FIT for 20 years and 50% for 15 years). Each
column shows the annual remuneration to wind power plants installed in the year marked in the
first row. Each entry of Table 17 is given by multiplying the corresponding entry of Table 13
with 0.5 times the sum of corresponding entries of Tables 14 and 16. Table 18 shows the
annualized remuneration for each vintage of capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. In order
to calculate it we discount the remunerations in the columns of Table 13 at fixed rate of 7% to
the first year of activity, sum them to get the initial NPV, and redistribute the NPV in a 25-year
mortgage using the same interest rate. Years 2009 and 2010 show the sum of the annualized
remuneration for on-shore and off-shore wind. The total equalized remuneration of a given
year consists of the sum of the annualized payment for the capacities in service in that year.
For example, the equalized remuneration of year 2008 is given by summing all the annualized
remuneration from year 2000 to year 2008, as all capacity build from 2000 is still in activity in
2008.
On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 9.5
2001 7.3 3.2
2002 8.0 3.5 4.3
2003 7.8 3.4 4.2 3.4
2004 9.4 4.1 5.0 4.0 3.1
2005 9.0 3.9 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.6
2006 9.1 4.0 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.6 3.3
2007 10.9 4.7 5.8 4.7 3.6 3.2 3.9 2.9
2008 10.4 4.5 5.5 4.5 3.4 3.0 3.7 2.7 2.8
2009 9.2 4.0 4.9 3.9 3.0 2.7 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 0.04
2010 8.4 3.7 4.5 3.6 2.8 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.1 0.04 0.1
2011 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2012 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2013 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2014 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2015 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2016 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2017 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2018 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2019 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2020 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2021 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2022 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2023 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2024 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2025 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2026 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2027 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2028 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2029 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2030 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2031 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2032 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2033 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2034 2.3 0.1
Table 13: assumed annual energy generated by wind power plants installed in different
years. Data are in TWh.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 10.9
2001 10.7 10.7
2002 10.5 10.5 10.4
2003 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.1
2004 10.2 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8
2005 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.4
2006 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.3 9.1
2007 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.7
2008 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.3
2009 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.3 9.5 15.5
2010 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.4 8.2 9.4 9.3 15.3 15.3
2011 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 9.2 9.1 15.0 15.0
2012 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 9.0 8.9 14.7 14.7
2013 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 8.8 8.8 14.4 14.4
2014 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 8.7 8.6 14.1 14.1
2015 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 8.5 8.4 13.9 13.9
2016 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 8.3 8.3 13.6 13.6
2017 8.1 8.1 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 8.2 8.1 13.3 13.3
2018 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 8.0 7.9 13.1 13.1
2019 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.9 7.8 12.8 12.8
2020 5.0 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.7 7.6 12.6 12.6
2021 5.0 5.0 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.6 7.6 7.5 12.3 12.3
2022 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.5 7.4 7.3 12.1 12.1
2023 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.3 7.3 7.2 11.8 11.8
2024 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.2 7.1 7.0 11.6 11.6
2025 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.3 6.2 6.1 7.0 6.9 11.4 11.4
2026 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.1 6.0 6.8 6.8 11.1 11.1
2027 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.9 6.7 6.6 10.9 10.9
2028 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.6 6.5 10.7 10.7
2029 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.4 5.0 10.5
2030 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2031 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2032 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2033 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2034 5.0 5.0
Table 14: annual real prices of electricity paid to wind energy from power plants installed
in different years and receiving the high FIT for 20 years. Data are in ¢(2011)/kWh.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Annual inflation rate 1.45 1.98 1.40 1.04 1.67 1.56 1.58 2.29 2.63 0.31 1.14 2.30
Table 15: Average annual inflation rate. Source: German Federal Statistical Office,
www.destatis.de.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 10.9
2001 10.7 10.7
2002 10.5 10.5 10.3
2003 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.1
2004 10.2 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8
2005 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.4
2006 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.3 9.1
2007 9.7 9.7 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.7
2008 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.3
2009 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 9.5 15.5
2010 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 9.4 9.3 15.3 15.3
2011 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 9.2 9.1 15.0 15.0
2012 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 9.0 8.9 14.7 14.7
2013 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 8.8 8.8 14.4 14.4
2014 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 8.7 8.6 14.1 14.1
2015 5.7 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 8.5 8.4 13.9 13.9
2016 5.6 5.6 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 8.3 8.2 13.6 13.6
2017 5.5 5.5 5.4 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 8.2 8.1 13.3 13.3
2018 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.2 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 8.0 7.9 13.1 13.1
2019 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.9 7.8 12.8 12.8
2020 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.7 7.6 12.6 12.6
2021 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.7 6.6 7.5 7.5 12.3 12.3
2022 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.5 7.4 7.3 12.1 12.1
2023 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.3 7.2 11.8 11.8
2024 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 5.0 11.6
2025 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2026 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2027 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2028 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2029 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2030 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2031 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2032 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2033 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2034 5.0 5.0
Table 16: annual real prices of electricity paid to wind energy from power plants installed
in different years and receiving the high FIT for 15 years. Data are in ¢(2011)/kWh.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 1034
2001 780 339
2002 844 367 441
2003 812 354 425 338
2004 957 416 501 398 303
2005 909 396 476 378 288 247
2006 902 393 472 375 286 245 297
2007 1058 460 553 440 335 287 349 252
2008 980 427 513 408 310 266 323 234 233
2009 862 375 451 359 273 234 284 205 205 269 6
2010 785 342 411 327 248 213 259 187 186 245 192 6 21
2011 871 379 456 363 276 237 287 208 207 272 213 6 20
2012 854 372 447 355 270 232 282 204 203 266 209 6 20
2013 837 364 438 348 265 227 276 200 199 261 205 5 20
2014 821 357 430 342 260 223 271 196 195 256 201 5 19
2015 676 350 421 335 255 219 265 192 191 251 197 5 19
2016 663 288 413 328 250 214 260 188 187 246 193 5 18
2017 650 283 340 322 245 210 255 184 184 241 189 5 18
2018 637 277 333 265 240 206 250 181 180 236 185 5 18
2019 625 272 327 260 197 202 245 177 177 232 182 5 17
2020 479 267 321 255 195 168 240 174 173 227 178 5 17
2021 479 208 314 251 192 166 204 170 170 223 175 5 17
2022 479 208 254 248 190 165 201 147 166 218 171 5 16
2023 479 208 254 205 188 163 199 145 146 214 168 4 16
2024 479 208 254 205 159 161 197 144 144 179 165 3 16
2025 208 254 205 159 139 195 142 143 177 139 3 11
2026 254 205 159 139 172 141 141 175 137 3 11
2027 205 159 139 172 127 140 173 136 3 11
2028 159 139 172 127 129 171 134 3 11
2029 139 172 127 129 148 133 2 11
2030 172 127 129 148 117 2 7
2031 127 129 148 117 2 7
2032 129 148 117 2 7
2033 148 117 2 7
2034 117 7
Table 17: annual remunerations for wind energy in the Medium FIT scenario. Data are in
Me(2011).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annualized remuneration 824 351 425 338 257 218 262 188 182 230 178
Equalized remuneration 824 1176 1601 1938 2196 2414 2676 2864 3047 3276 3454
Table 18: Annualized remuneration: annualized remuneration of every vintage of wind
capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. Equalized remuneration: sum of the annualized
remunerations of all capacity in service. Data are in Me(2011).
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B Solar annualized economic cost
This appendix shows in details the calculations of the equalized remuneration for solar energy.
Table 19 shows the assumed electricity produced by each vintage of capacity from year 2000
to year 2010. It is calculated similarly to the corresponding Table for wind (Table 13). The
entries on the rows are calculated in the following way: for the period 2000-2010 we allocate
the historical annual electricity generated by solar (cf. Table 2) assuming a constant annual
capacity factor; as from 2010 up to the end of the lifetime of the power plants we assume a
constant fixed capacity factor of 8.14%.
Table 20 shows the annual real price of electricity paid to solar energy. Results take into
account inflation and are in e(2011). Each column shows the annual electricity price paid to
solar energy generated by power plants installed in the year marked in the first row. Solar
energy producers receive a constant FIT for 20 years. Until 2003 there was a single level of FIT
for all solar facilities, from 2004 the level depends on the capacity and location of the power
plant. There are no data on the average level of FIT for solar power plants since 2004, but
we can make use the historical data on the total expenditure of solar FIT (available from 2002,
cf. Table 1) to estimate it. For power plants built in the period 2000-2001, we assume that
they receive a FIT as in Table 1 and we apply it for 20 years. As from year 2002, we estimate
the average FIT as follows: we take the annual total expenditure of solar FIT, we subtract the
assumed expenditure of FIT for power plants installed the years before by assuming annual
constant capacity factor, and we divide the result by the assumed total energy produced by the
facilities installed that year as in Table 20. For example the average FIT for the power plants
build in 2002 is estimated by subtracting to the 2002 annual expenditure of solar FIT, which is
Me95 in e(2011) (cf. Table 1), the quantity paid to the installations built in 2000 and 2001
assuming constant capacity factor (that is given by the sum of the first two elements of the third
row of Table 19 times the corresponding elements of Table 20), and dividing it by 60GWh (the
third element of the third row of Table 19).
Table 21 shows the annualized payment for each vintage of capacity from year 2000 to
year 2010. Each entry of Table 21 is given by multiplying the corresponding entry of Table 19
with the entry of Table 20. Table 22 shows the annualized remuneration for solar generation
cost of all the power plants that belong to the same vintage of installation the total equalized
remuneration. It is calculated similarly to Table 18.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000 64
2001 31 45
2002 42 60 60
2003 55 79 79 100
2004 38 55 55 70 337
2005 47 69 69 87 418 593
2006 58 84 84 106 513 728 646
2007 56 81 81 102 494 701 622 937
2008 55 79 79 100 484 687 609 918 1408
2009 50 73 73 92 445 631 559 843 1294 2517
2010 51 74 74 94 452 641 569 857 1315 2559 4995
2011 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2012 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2013 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2014 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2015 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2016 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2017 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2018 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2019 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2020 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2021 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2022 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2023 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2024 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2025 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2026 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2027 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2028 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2029 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2030 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2031 906 1390 2705 5281
2032 1390 2705 5281
2033 2705 5281
2034 5281
Table 19: assumed annual energy generated by solar capacity installed in different years.
Data are in GWh.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000 60.4
2001 59.3 59.3
2002 58.4 58.4 57.5
2003 57.8 57.8 56.9 53.0
2004 56.9 56.9 56.0 52.1 58.4
2005 56.0 56.0 55.1 51.3 57.5 61.4
2006 55.2 55.2 54.3 50.5 56.6 60.5 57.9
2007 53.9 53.9 53.0 49.4 55.3 59.1 56.6 52.8
2008 52.5 52.5 51.7 48.1 53.9 57.6 55.1 51.4 48.2
2009 52.4 52.4 51.5 48.0 53.7 57.4 54.9 51.3 48.0 46.0
2010 51.8 51.8 50.9 47.4 53.1 56.8 54.3 50.7 47.5 45.4 38.5
2011 50.6 50.6 49.8 46.4 51.9 55.5 53.1 49.6 46.4 44.4 37.7
2012 49.6 49.6 48.8 45.4 50.9 54.4 52.1 48.6 45.5 43.5 36.9
2013 48.7 48.7 47.9 44.6 49.9 53.3 51.0 47.6 44.6 42.7 36.2
2014 47.7 47.7 46.9 43.7 48.9 52.3 50.0 46.7 43.8 41.9 35.5
2015 46.8 46.8 46.0 42.8 48.0 51.3 49.1 45.8 42.9 41.0 34.8
2016 45.8 45.8 45.1 42.0 47.0 50.3 48.1 44.9 42.1 40.2 34.1
2017 44.9 44.9 44.2 41.2 46.1 49.3 47.2 44.0 41.2 39.4 33.4
2018 44.1 44.1 43.4 40.4 45.2 48.3 46.2 43.2 40.4 38.7 32.8
2019 43.2 43.2 42.5 39.6 44.3 47.4 45.3 42.3 39.6 37.9 32.1
2020 5.0 42.4 41.7 38.8 43.4 46.4 44.4 41.5 38.9 37.2 31.5
2021 5.0 5.0 40.9 38.0 42.6 45.5 43.6 40.7 38.1 36.4 30.9
2022 5.0 5.0 5.0 37.3 41.8 44.6 42.7 39.9 37.3 35.7 30.3
2023 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 40.9 43.7 41.9 39.1 36.6 35.0 29.7
2024 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 42.9 41.1 38.3 35.9 34.3 29.1
2025 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 40.2 37.6 35.2 33.7 28.5
2026 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 36.8 34.5 33.0 28.0
2027 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 33.8 32.4 27.4
2028 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 31.7 26.9
2029 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 26.4
2030 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2031 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2032 5.0 5.0 5.0
2033 5.0 5.0
2034 5.0
Table 20: annual real prices of electricity paid to wind energy from capacity installed in
different years. Data are in ¢(2011)/kWh.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000 39
2001 18 27
2002 24 35 35
2003 32 46 45 53
2004 22 32 31 36 197
2005 27 38 38 44 240 364
2006 32 46 46 54 290 440 374
2007 30 44 43 51 273 414 352 495
2008 29 42 41 48 261 395 336 472 679
2009 26 38 38 44 239 362 307 433 622 1157
2010 27 38 38 44 240 364 309 435 625 1163 1925
2011 27 40 39 46 248 376 319 449 646 1202 1989
2012 27 39 38 45 243 369 313 440 633 1178 1950
2013 26 38 38 44 238 362 307 432 621 1155 1912
2014 26 37 37 43 234 355 301 423 608 1132 1874
2015 25 37 36 42 229 348 295 415 597 1110 1837
2016 25 36 35 42 225 341 289 407 585 1088 1801
2017 24 35 35 41 220 334 283 399 573 1067 1766
2018 24 35 34 40 216 328 278 391 562 1046 1731
2019 23 34 33 39 212 321 272 383 551 1026 1697
2020 3 33 33 38 208 315 267 376 540 1005 1664
2021 3 4 32 38 203 309 262 369 530 986 1631
2022 3 4 4 37 200 303 257 361 519 966 1599
2023 3 4 4 5 196 297 252 354 509 947 1568
2024 3 4 4 5 24 291 247 347 499 929 1537
2025 4 4 5 24 34 242 340 489 911 1507
2026 4 5 24 34 30 334 480 893 1478
2027 5 24 34 30 45 470 875 1449
2028 24 34 30 45 70 858 1420
2029 34 30 45 70 135 1392
2030 30 45 70 135 264
2031 45 70 135 264
2032 70 135 264
2033 135 264
2034 264
Table 21: annual remunerations for solar energy. Data are in Me(2011).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annualized remuneration 25 35 35 41 217 333 281 385 542 989 1620
Equalized remuneration 25 60 94 136 353 685 966 1351 1893 2882 4503
Table 22: Annualized remuneration: annualized remuneration of every vintage of solar
capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. Equalized remuneration: sum of the annualized
remunerations of all capacity in service. Data are in Me(2011).
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